Reliable performance of hardware has been a requirement for digital systems since the construction of the first digital computer. Improper functioning of the logic circuits in a digital system is manifested by logic faults, which are defined for this paper as "permanent or transient deviations of logic variables from the values specified in design." Permanent faults are caused by physical changes in the components of a logic circuit which permanently alter the logic function specified by the designer. The most common permanent faults are the determinate faults of "stuck on zero" and "stuck on one" types. Less frequent is the indeterminate or "stuck on X" fault, in which the logic variable assumes both "zero" and "one" values improperly during a sequence of operations. Faults also differ in their extent: a local fault affects only one logic circuit, while a distributed (or catastrophic) fault occurs when one failure creates faults in several logic circuits of the same system. Transient faults are caused by temporary changes in the properties of logic circuits, which lead to deviations from the specified values of logic variables. Such transient faults also belong to one of the above listed categories. They are caused either by external influences (electromagnetic interference, noise in power supply, etc.) or by temporary circuit malfunctions (overheating, overload conditions, etc.) . External causes may simultaneously induce many faults throughout the system, therefore independent occurrence cannot be assumed for all transient faults.
At the system level a logic fault is manifested as an error in the program being executed by the system. Two types of errors may be distinguished. A word error occurs when a computer word (data word or instruction) is altered by a fault. A description of the alteration is called the damage pattern of the fault. A logic error occurs when an individual logic variable, which is not a part of a structured word, is altered by a fault. Examples of such variables are the various control signals in a computer. A logic error alters the algorithm being executed in some undersirable manner.
The present paper is concerned with the introduction of fault-tolerance in order to increase the reliability and availability of a digital system. We say that a system is fault-tolerant if its programs can be properly executed despite the occurrence of logic faults. All above discussed types of faults and errors need to be considered in the design of a fault-tolerant computer. Theoretical studies of fault-tolerance need a clear identification of the types of faults and/or errors which are to be tolerated.
Protective redundancy for fault-tolerance
Reliable performance of digital systems is usually attained by the systematic application of two techniques. The first is the selection of highly reliable components and the use of proven methods for their interconnection and packaging. The second technique is an extensive verification of the logic design, of the programs, and of the finished hardware, first by simulation and later by diagnostic and functional tests under expected environmental conditions. In spite of these reliability assurance techniques, the system may still fail during use because of uncontrollable or undetected faults. These are caused by undetected design errors, random failures of components or connections, and externally induced malfunctions during the operation of the system.
The effects of logic faults can be eliminated by the introduction of protective redundancy into the system. A computer system contains protective redundancy if faults can be tolerated because of the use of additional components or programs, or the use of more time for the computational tasks. These additional components, programs, and time are not required by the system in order to execute the specified tasks as long as faults do not occur. The techniques of protective redundancy may be divided into two major categories: massive (also called masking) redundancy and selective redundancy. In the massive (masking) redundancy approach the effect of a faulty component, circuit, signal, subsystem, or system is masked instantaneously by permanently connected and concurrently operating replicas of the faulty element. The level at which replication occurs ranges from individual circuit components to entire self-contained systems. Theoretical studies of massive redundancy were initiated in January 1952 by John von Neumann in a series of five lectures at the California Institute of Technology.
1 Other pioneering contributions in this field are due to C. J. Creveling, 2 and to E. F. Moore and C. E. Shannon. 3 The subject has attracted considerable attention in the past decade, and four principal techniques of massive redundancy may be distinguished among the published studies. These techniques are:
1. Replication of circuit components: e.g., "quadded" diodes, resistors, transistors, duplicated connections, etc. 4. Replication of entire systems with comparison or voting at system level.
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The category of selective redundancy encompasses redundancy techniques which fall outside the definition of massive redundancy. Since instantaneous masking is excluded in the selective technique, it is necessary to detect the presence of a fault. Subsequently, the fault is made harmless by a corrective action. The techniques of fault detection fall into two major categories:
1. Concurrent diagnosis by the application of errordetecting codes and special monitoring circuits. Detection occurs while the system is being used. It must be emphasized that the preceding classification of protective redundancy techniques is intended to facilitate a systematic approach to the study of faulttolerant systems. In most practical cases a mixture of these techniques has been proposed or used in order to attain fault-tolerance. The references which are cited in this section contain fundamental contributions to the theory of protective redundancy, and have been chosen to serve as illustrations of the various approaches. However, this is not an exhaustive listing of all relevant contributions, and the reader is referred to bibliographies in the cited references for further papers. Especially the book by W. H. Pierce 9 and the recent study by J. Goldberg, et al., 33 contain very extensive bibliographies on protective redundancy. The latter study includes numerous references to Russian publications in this field as well as reviews of various techniques.
State of the art in the design of faulttolerant computers
The continuing increases in the speed and complexity of digital systems accelerate the demand for fault-tolerance. The cost of uncorrected errors is especially severe in large time-shared computer service systems and in situations in which a computer controls a very valuable system, and is not accessible to human repair. Examples are a real-time control computer and a spacecraft computer controlling an interplanetary mission. A second critical requirement for fault-tolerance exists when human lives may be affected by computer errors, e.g., in military defense systems and in control of high-speed transportation or of medical systems.
The most immediate solution in such critical applications has been the replication of entire systems, 111213 frequently backed up by transfer of control to a human operator or to a separate, less precise backup system. The replication at system level becomes extremely costly when very large and fast systems (e.g., time-shared "computer utility" systems) must be replicated. Furthermore, occurrence of independent faults in two or more replicas is more probable as the systems become more complex or as the required unattended lifetime is increased. The need for lower cost of protective redundancy and for longer mean life values of protected systems has stimulated studies of other methods of fault-tolerance.
In the early stages of development attention had been directed toward massive redundancy at the lowest level -the replication of individual components (resistors, transistors, etc.) 37 In the most important application to this date, the guidance computer for the Saturn V spacecraft launch vehicle has been designed employing TMR techniques in its arithmetic and control sections. 6 ' 38 This large-scale application of TMR may be expected to provide a practical assessment of its effectiveness.
TMR and related types of massive redundancy at the level of logic signals offer both obvious advantages and some serious drawbacks in a general comparison to selective redundancy. The principal advantages of massive redundancy are:
1. The corrective action is immediate and "wiredin," while it is delayed and may require switching in selective redundancy. 2. During operation there is no need for fault detection, which is essential in selective redundancy. 3. All parts of the system are equally protected; unprotected "hard core" elements may exist only at interfaces with other systems. In most selective redundancy schemes a "hard core" exists in the system. 4. The conversion of a non-redundant design to a massively redundant one is relatively straightforward, while more novel design techniques are demanded by the introduction of selective redundancy. Compared to massive redundancy, the selective form requires several additional features: a system ability to tolerate interruptions for repair and to execute a "rollback" for error correction, sophisticated diagnosis methods, protection for the "hard core," and trade-off studies between time, program, and hardware replication. The advantages of selective redundancy over the massive form are, however, also very significant in most applications:
1. Power is required by only one copy of each replaceable item in a replacement system; all parts require power in the massive form. 2. The replacement switch provides fault isolation between subsystems; such isolation is essential in the case of catastrophic failures. Massive redundancy usually assumes independent failures of logic elements; such independence requires isolation which is difficult to provide for batch-fabricated integrated circuit packages. The entire batch may possess the same defect; also, mechanical or thermal damage is likely to affect an entire package, rather than single logic circuits. 3. All spares can be utilized in selective redundancy;
in the massive form a majority of faulty elements in a given region leads to system failure. 4. The designs of individual replaceable blocks may be altered, and the number of spares may be adjusted to a given requirement without changes in the system design in the case of selective redundancy; such changes are more difficult in the massive case. 5. The replication in massive redundancy frequently leads to increased fan-out and fan-in requirements for logic elements, or to increased tolerance limits in circuit design; such problems are avoided in the selective case. 6. Permanent connection of the redundant elements makes the initial check-out more difficult to implement in systems with massive redundancy; special circuits and system outputs are necessary. 7. Massively redundant systems with voting require synchronization of the separate channels at the voting elements; they also are susceptible to transient external influences (e.g., sparks) which alter logic signals in a majority of channels without leaving permanent damage. In conclusion it is noted that the rapid development of integrated circuit technology is causing a shift of emphasis from massive to selective redundancy techniques in which functional units of a system are replaceable as single elements. It is also possible that massive redundancy will find a new application in large-scale integration, serving to mask manufacturing defects and thus increasing the yield of the manufacturing process.
Design considerations for a fault-tolerant spacecraft computer
Theoretical studies of selective redundancy, and specifically of replacement systems, indicate that a significant increase in the availability and in the mean life of a digital system may be attained without the high cost of complete replication and concurrent operation of several copies of a system. The challenge to the designer at the present time is to create computer systems which translate the theory into a working system which uses state-of-the-art components, meets current performance requirements, and attains the theoretically possible gains in reliability.
The choice of a method or of a combination of methods of redundancy for a particular computing system is influenced by the intended application. The present section considers the application of protective redundancy to a guidance and control computer for an unmanned interplanetary spacecraft. The computer may also be employed for the onboard processing of scientific data when guidance computation is no in progress. The guidance computer is required to survive space voyages to other planets which range up to several years in duration and to perform approach guidance and control computations at the end of the voyage. Continued control of the spacecraft after arrival, processing of scientific data collected, control of the landing and operation of a capsule, and guidance for a return voyage may also be required. Course corrections are to be computed one or more times during the mission; considerable time is available for this task. The computing at launch and in early stages of the mission may be performed or supported by computers on the ground and in the launch vehicle. The very long communication distances and possible occultation of the spacecraft make Earth-based support ineffective at the destination planet. The computations which are required at a remote destination present the most demanding problem to the spacecraft guidance and control computer.
The design of a spacecraft computer must be performed within the strict constraints of the available power, weight, and volume. The existence of these constraints indicates an advantage for selective redundancy, which does not necessarily require power for the spare replicas and which offers protection with the minimum of one spare for each operating element. An evaluation of relative advantages of the massive and selective redundancy approaches has led to the choice of selective redundancy for fault-tolerance in a spacecraft guidance computer which is being developed at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. It will be called the "JPL Self-Testing And -Repairing" (abbreviated JPL-STAR) computer in this paper. The performance requirements demand a certain computing capacity at the end of a long voyage, and there are no requirements for a higher computing capacity at an earlier time during the mission. Under these conditions, a fixed-configuration replacement system possessing the required capacity is preferred over a reorganizable or "degradable" system which has a minimal configuration of the same capacity. The replacement system is a simpler solution, since it avoids the programs, switches, and control hardware which perform the reconfiguration and resulting rescheduling of operation.
A replacement system provides to the user one standard configuration of functional subsystems which has the required computing capacity. The standard computer is supplemented by one or more spares of each subsystem. The spares are held in a standby condition and serve as replacements of operating units when permanent faults are discovered. The presence of spares imposes additional requirements on the selectively redundant system. In addition to the ordinary functions of a computer, the system must incorporate some means of fault detection, a recovery procedure for the case of transient faults, a replacement procedure and a switch for the case of permanent faults, and a checkout procedure for all spares before the mission. The standard configuration itself must be designed as an array of self-contained functional subsystems with clearly defined interfaces for replacement switching. The hardware or software which controls the recovery and/or replacement must be fault-tolerant as well.
Early in the design fundamental choices must be made between hardware and software implementations of the fault detection and recovery procedures. The current generation of aerospace computers almost exclusively uses software techniques, supplemented by hardware for parity checking of data storage and transfer. The continuing decrease in the size and in power requirements of integrated electronic circuits, as well as the vulnerability of software techniques in the case of memory failures, led to the choice of a hardware implementation of fault detection and recovery in the JPL-STAR computer. The experimental breadboard Model I JPL-STAR system is expected to provide valuable operational experience about such an extensive use of hardware techniques in a replacement system. An actual hardware design rather than simulation was chosen in order to explore the circuit aspects of switching, fault detection, isolation of faulty subsystems, and recovery from transient faults.
Fault detection in digital circuits is implemented either by periodic or by concurrent diagnosis. The currently most common approach is periodic diagnosis which utilizes a diagnostic program stored in the memory. Computation is periodically interrupted and the diagnostic program is executed. Detection of a fault initiates the replacement procedure; the program is "rolled back" to a point preceding the previous (successful) diagnosis period. Errors in computation which have been caused by transient faults remain undetected in this approach. The diagnosis program itself is vulnerable to faults in the memory system. The cost of diagnosis consists of the storage used for the diagnostic program, of the time consumed by its execution and of the time needed for repair and repeated execution of the program segment which was run after the last diagnosis. Such time costs are very severe in re-entry and landing programs for guidance and control which require real-time computing. The alternate diagnosis method is concurrent diagnosis in which error-detecting codes and monitoring circuits are employed to show the presence of faults. The execution of every instruction is checked immediately; instead of the stored diagnostic program, the cost is in hardware and consists of the logic circuits which perform the code checking algorithm and the other monitoring circuits. Errors due to transient faults are detectable, and the immediate detection of a fault permits a relatively short rollback of the program. For these reasons concurrent diagnosis has been chosen for fault detection in the JPL-STAR computer. The simplest and most costly error-detecting code (100% redundancy) is the complete duplication of program and data words. Errors are indicated by the disagreement of two words; further diagnosis is needed to pinpoint the faulty source.
Parity and other more complex codes which detect errors in the transmission of digital data have a lower redundancy, but are not suitable for the checking of arithmetic operations. In order to apply a uniform code in the entire system, arithmetical error-detecting codes were selected as a means of concurrent diagnosis for the JPL-STAR system. An extensive theoretical investigation of the effectiveness, cost and applicability of arithmetic codes was conducted prior to the system design of the JPL-STAR computer. 1617 The results showed the existence of a class of low-cost codes with sufficient effectiveness of error detection for concurrent diagnosis. The code-checking circuits are supplemented by monitoring circuits which verify the synchronization of operation for the various subsystems. Other circuits compare duplicated critical functions of the subsystems and measure important circuit parameters (e.g., read and write currents in memory units). The monitoring circuits are included in order to detect the faults which are not always indicated by the code checking algorithm.
Recovery and replacement procedures require both software and hardware contributions. Consistently with the choice of hardware for fault detection, the JPL-STAR computer employs hardware implementation to the furthest possible degree in these procedures as well. The most fundamental hardware consideration in a replacement system is the method of switching and the nature of the switch which implements the replacement operation. The reliability of the switch is a limiting factor in the estimates of reliability for the entire system. Furthermore, the switch must provide complete isolation in the case of catastrophic failures occurring in the part of a computer which is to be replaced. The principal alternatives in the choice of a switching method are information switching and power switching. A study of switching techniques 43 has led to the conclusion that the switching of power to replaceable units offers strong isolation against catastrophic failures and minimizes the number of switches requiring extreme reliability. Furthermore, the data transmission speed within the computer is not affected by the circuit properties of the switch. A magnetic power switch for the JPL-STAR computer which is an integral part of a replaceable unit has been designed and constructed. The switch is a part of the unit's power supply and is designed to fail asymmetrically-in an open mode.
The use of a power switch requires that all unpowered copies of a replaceable unit should be permanently attached to the data transmission busses of the system. As a consequence, an unpowered unit is required to produce only logic signals of value "zero" on all of its output lines. Furthermore, all input and output lines of every replaceable unit are isolated from the busses in order to prevent shorting of a bus by a short inside the unit.
Organization of the J PL-STAR computer, model I
The preceding section has outlined the principal alternatives which were considered in the choice of fault-tolerance techniques for the JPL-STAR computer. An experimental breadboard Model I of the JPL-STAR computer has been designed and is presently being constructed. The main objectives of the Mod I STAR computer are to gain experience with the hardware aspects of a replacement system and to conduct experiments with fault detection and recovery procedures. The performance specifications of the Mod I STAR computer are similar to those of many presentgeneration aerospace computers; they have not been matched to any specific application. The fundamental choices in fault-tolerance techniques are as follows:
1. All machine words (data and instructions) are encoded in an error-detecting code. 2. The computer is subdivided into several replaceable functional units. 3. Fault detection, recovery, and replacement are carried out by special-purpose hardware; software techniques may be added later to provide additional fault-tolerance features. 4. Replacement is implemented by power switching: units are removed by turning power off, and connected by turning power on. 5. The information lines of all units are permanently connected to the busses through isolating circuits; unpowered units produce only logic "zero" outputs. 6. The error-detecting code is supplemented by monitoring circuits which serve to verify the proper synchronization and internal operation of the functional units. The Model I employs a 32-bit word length for its operands and instructions. Machine words are transmitted between the functional units in four-bit bytes, that is, in a series-parallel mode. The functional units contain their own sequence generators and possess identical input and output connections. A typical functional unit is shown in Figure 1 . The "Info. Input" and "Info. Output" lines are connected to information busses. They receive and send coded machine words, one byte at a time. The "Switch Control" line supplies the "change position" command to the power switch, while the present switch position is shown by the "Switch Status" line. The other control input lines supply a "Clock" pulse train input, a synchronization test signal ("Sync"), and a "Reset" signal which places the functional unit into a standard state. There are also three more status output lines. The "Active" signal 45 In order to gain a better understanding of the relative virtues of these two methods, both are employed in the Model I: product coding for numeric operands, and residue coding for addresses. Figure 3 shows the formats of numeric operands and instructions. The numeric operands (Figure 3a ) are 32 bits long binary product-coded numbers with the check factor 15. Binary numeric operands x (28 bits long) are multiplied by 15 to obtain the product coded 32-bit operands 15x. The check factor 15 has been found to be especially effective in the case of series-parallel transmission and computing in bytes of 4 bits length.
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The checking algorithm computes the modulo 15 residue of coded words which are transmitted on the busses. A zero residue (represented by 1111) indicates a coded word; all other values indicate a fault in the functional unit which delivered the word to the bus.
The 32-bit instruction words (Figure 3b ) consist of a 12-bit operation code and a 20-bit address part. The address part is encoded in the residue code with the check modulus 15. An address part consists of a 16-bit binary address a and a 4-bit check symbol c(a). The check symbol c(a) has the value c(a) = 15 -| a | « where J a | « is the modulo 15 residue of a. The checking algorithm computes the modulo 15 residue of an address and adds it (modulo 15) to the check symbol c(a).
A zero sum (represented by 1111) indicates a properly coded address part. The residue code is preferable for address parts over the product code because it is separable, and the address a is available to the memory address decoding circ ifc (\rA\ni\rv 'hinarv form. It is important to note that the "one's complement" 15 -1 a | is rather than the residue j a j , 5 itself is used as the check symbol c(a). In this case the fault-detection effectiveness in byte-serial operation remains the same as for product-coded operands, while the use of ] a | 15 as a check symbol gives a lower effectiveness. Furthermore, the bus checking algorithm is the same for product-coded operands and for address parts-it is simply a modulo 15 summation of all bytes and a test of the result for the zero value represented by 1111.
The operation code is divided into three bytes of four bits each. The operation code bytes are protected by a 2-out-of-4 encoding, which leaves six valid words in a four-bit byte. Such coding is most efficient for short words and is acceptable in a computer because operation codes are not subjected to arithmetic operations. It is evident that their validity must be tested by a separate checking circuit, since it cannot be verified by the modulo 15 checker (which is bypassed by the operation codes). The separation of the operation code into three separately encoded bytes facilitates the decoding and validity testing of op. codes received by the functional units. The 2-out-of-4 encoding gives a total of 216 distinct combinations for operation codes. The indication of index registers which are to be used al1 Joint Computer Conference, 1967 must be contained within the operation code. Since the Model I contains two index registers, every indexable operation code requires three distinct combinations, while non-indexable operations require only one each.
It is apparent that residue encoding with the check modulus 15 can be applied to the numeric operands and to the operation codes as well as to the address parts. Such use of a uniform residue code has the advantages of code separability and of identical check algorithms. In the case of operation codes, a modulo 15 residue-coded 12-bit number provides 256 distinct combinations. On the other hand, the 2-out-of-4 coding for individual bytes of the operation code permits validation and use of individual bytes. The choice of three different methods of encoding in the Model I was motivated by the need to gain detailed insight into their relative merits and shortcomings.
One instruction cycle is executed by the Model I JPL-STAR system in three steps. In the first step, the address of the instruction is sent from the Sequence Register in the Control Arithmetic Processor to the memory units; the transmission of the address is tested by the Bus Checker. In the second step, the addressed memory unit broadcasts the operation code and address to all functional units. The appropriate units recognize the code, accept the address, and initiate execution. In the third step (if needed) the instruction is executed, a result is placed on the bus and accepted by the destination unit. The Bus Checkers test every word on the busses for proper encoding.
Functional units of model I
The replaceable functional units of the computer have a standard format for their output words and have the same internal communication lines, as shown in Figure 1 and described previously. The Input/Output and Interrupt units also have external communication lines to the spacecraft. Brief descriptions of the functional units are given in this section.
The Main Arithmetic Processor (MAP) accepts the operands and delivers the results as 32-bit productcoded binary numbers. All arithmetic control is contained in the MAP; an input consists of an operation code (add, subtract, multiply, divide) followed by a coded operand, and the output is a coded result followed by a 2-out-of-4 Condition Code byte, indicating eithet one of three singularities (sum overflow, quotient overflow, zero divisor) or the type of a good result (positive, zero, negative). The good result codes are used by the CAP as data for conditional jump instructions. All partial and final results are delivered to the Bus Checker #2. A breadboard model of the MAP has been constructed and tested. 46 It is believed to be the first complete arithmetic processor for productcoded operands. The Control Arithmetic Processor (CAP) contains two Index Registers (IR), the Sequence Register (SR), the Condition Code Register (CCR), and an adder. When the 16-bit index word x from the IR is added to an address a, its 4-bit check symbol c(x) is added modulo 15 to c(a). The indexed address and the new check symbol go past the Bus Checker #2 to the input lines of the memory units. The incrementing (by one) of the current address s in the SR is performed in exactly the same manner, with 1 added to s and 14 = ~(1) added modulo 15 to c(s). The incremented address is returned to the SR. The presence of the Condition Code byte in the CAP permits fast execution of conditional jump instructions.
The Logic Processor (LOP) performs the bit-by-bit logic operations, shifts, and code conversions on input operand words. It contains the Logic Accumulator (LAR) and the Mask Register (MR). The arithmetic coding is removed from the operand before the operation, since arithmetic codes are not preserved during logic operations. The final result is again encoded; provisions exist for both product and residue codes. The LOP is therefore capable of encoding input words, removing code from output words, and executing conversions between product and residue codes. A fourbit adder is included for encoding and decoding operations. Functioning of the LOP is checked by operating two copids concurrently and comparing all results.
The Read-Only Memory (ROM) unit contains the permanent programs and the associated constants for a given mission. The experimental model provides 2" words of 32 bits each, using a "braid" assembly of transformers and wires for the permanent storage of binary information. 47 The ROM also contains all necessary peripheral electronics: the op. code, address, and output registers, access circuits, drivers, sequence control, and monitoring circuits. All output words from the ROM are delivered past Bus Checker #1. The Model I JPL-STAR computer includes complete replicas of the ROM as replacements; the replacement of peripheral electronics without discarding the core and wire assembly is being studied.
The Read-Write Memory (RWM) units are self-contained 4096 word modules with the same peripheral electronics as the ROM. Direct addressing is provided for 64K words, including the 16K ROM; this permits up to 12 RWM units. Each RWM unit has three modes of operation. In the standard mode a RWM unit recognizes its own wired-in unit address, and is connected to both input and output busses. In the auxiliary mode, a RWM unit stores and assumes the unit address of another unit, to be called its main unit. The Design of Fault-tolerant Computers 742 auxiliary unit stores the same input words as its main unit. When the main unit reads out a word to the bus, the auxiliary unit reads out the same word internally and compares it to the word which is on the bus. If the words disagree, the auxiliary unit signals a comparison error to the CDU. A "reverse" diagnostic command causes a reversal of roles between an auxiliary unit and its main unit. The third mode of RWM operation is the relocated mode, which utilizes a stored unit address, but otherwise is identical to the standard mode. A RWM unit is placed into or released from the auxiliary .or relocated mode by special instructions which are directed to its wired-in unit address. The auxiliary mode permits a redundant storage of machine words in one, two, or more separate units with continued comparison of readout supplementing the Bus Checker. The relocated mode permits a replacement of a failed RWM unit by a spare with the same unit address. The choice of employing redundant storage is left to the user.
The Interrupt Unit (IRU) and the Input-Output Unit (IOU) serve as interfaces with the external world. The IOU contains buffer registers for receiving and delivering machine words. The IRU receives commands from an outside operator and service requests from other parts of the spacecraft system. An interrupt is effected when the IRU places a properly coded instruction word on the bus, preempting the delivery of the next instruction specified by the Sequence Register. The details of interface protection remain to be established for specific spacecraft systems; in general, complete duplication will serve under most conditions. The System Clock Unit (SCU) contains counters needed for the sequencing and timekeeping functions of the computer and the spacecraft. Counter settings are coded machine words. The SCU generates an internal interrupt request when a preset count has been reached.
The two Bus Checkers (CHI and CH2) serve to check all machine words which are being transmitted on the busses for validity of encoding. The checking of arithmetic codes requires a four-bit Check Sum Accumulator (CSA) and a four-bit modulo 15 adder (with an end-around carry) which adds the bytes being transmitted to the word in the CSA. An error-status line to the CDU indicates whether the CSA contains an acceptable word (1111). The checking of the nonnumeric 2-out-of-4 operation code bytes is carried out by a separate logic circuit which also has an errorstatus line to the CDU. The relatively small size of the Bus Checkers makes their duplication quite practical for fault-tolerance.
The Control-Diagnosis Unit (CDU) issues the control signals for timing and for replacement. It also initiates the recovery actions when a fault is indicated by status outputs of the powered functional units and bus checkers. In normal operation, the internal timing o: the units is initiated for every instruction with the "Sync"signal and is tested by reception of the "Complete" signal. A copy of the current instruction is stored in the CIR register within the CDU and provides the data to verify all "Active" and "Complete" signals and the Bus Checker status signals. The CDU alsc contains the Rollback Point Register (RPR) which is loaded with an address under program control. Wher a fault is detected from the status signals, computing is "rolled back" to the instruction at this address and repeated in order to correct a transient fault. If a persistent fault is indicated by the same unit, a replacement is carried out, and the program is resumed at the rollback point. Software diagnosis may be employed to provide additional data on permanent faults. Periodic updating of the RPR is the responsibility of the programmer. For catastrophic transient faults (e.g., brief power loss) the CDU contains a wired-in "Restart" procedure.
The CDU acts as the "hard core" of the system and requires immediate fault-tolerance. The Model I STAR computer maintains four powered CDU copies. The CDU outputs are determined by a majority vote of three units; in the case of a disagreement, the minority unit is at once replaced by the operating fourth unit, and a new spare CDU is brought in and synchronized with the other powered units to act as an operating spare. Because of the four unit requirement, design effort has been concentrated on reducing the CDU to the least possible complexity. Experience with Model I is expected to yield further insights into this problem and to lead to modifications of the CDU design.
The performance of the JPL-STAR computer must be measured against an equivalent non-redundant computer. The important parameters are complexity, gain in mean life, and types of faults which can be tolerated. The first design objective has been the ability to tolerate a wide range of faults, including catastrophic (multiple dependent) transient and permanent faults in the functional units. The gain in mean life is being investigated by means of simulation (hardware and software) as well as by mathematical methods. The results of these studies will be reported upon completion of construction and hardware simulation.
